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Pornography-1980s style
Schauer appointed to Justice Department panel reviewing
obscenity issue
A widely respected constitutional theorist whose early legal
career included defending clients
involved in pornography litigation, Frederick Schauer has been
appointed by Attorney General
Edwin Meese III to an 11-member
committee to study the ramifications of sexually explicit material.
The panel, which began a monthly
series of public hearings in June,
was formed to gather information
on pornography and , if appropriate, recommend new ways to control it.
A similar commission, appointed by President Nixon in
1970, found little or no relationship
between pornography and delinquent or criminal behavior. However, Meese told a press conference that "reexamination of the issue is long overdue. " In the past
fifteen years, he said, "the content
of pornography has radically
changed, with more emphasis
upon extreme violence."
Schauer, a 1972 Harvard Law
School graduate who has taught at
Michigan since 1983, gained e perience in the practical aspects of the
issue as an attorney with Fine &
Ambrogne of Boston. The experience sparked his interest in
obscenity law, a field in which he
specialized after joining the West
Virginia Law School faculty in
1974. His writings have since
broadened to include the full
range of legal and philosophical
problems related to freedom of
speech and constitutional interpretation . His books, Th e Law of
Obscenity and Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry, together with an
extensive list of scholarly articles,
have earned him a reputation as
one of the nation's leading students of the First Amendment.

Though Schauer brings to the
commission a philosophical scepticism about many of the traditional justifications for free speech,
he describes himself as "someone
who is open-minded, who wants
to think about both sides, and who
wants to consider all possible arguments ." He explains, "In thinking about free speech--or speech
in general-we must start with the
assumption that speech, by and
large, causes consequences - both
good and bad . Now this does not
necessarily mean that all speech
causes all consequences, or that it
automatically causes the ones that
are being argued in this context.
That's what I' ve got to find out."
Schauer was referring to some
of the issues that are scheduled to
be discussed at the various hearings, including behavioral, psychiatric and psychological evidence
about the effects of pornography.
These themes, as well as issues of
law enforcement, free speech, the
nature of the pornography industry, child pornography, and others
will be covered as the hearings
progress through the end of the
year and move from Washington,
D.C. on to Miami, Chicago,
Houston, Los Angeles, and New
York.
It is on the free speech issue
that Schauer will bring his expertise to bear. "The First Amendment protects speech despite the
consequences that speech may
have," states Schauer. "It does not
follow that just because speech has
consequences, we can or should
regulate it. But that's what makes it
difficult to justify the free speech
argument in the first place - trying to come up with some reason
why, in spite of the consequences
it has, we should treat it as partly

Frederick Schauer
or completely immune from government regulation . On the other
hand, the Supreme Court has long
said that hard core pornography is
not speech in the First Amendment sense . I have written agreeing-that at least hard core
pornography is outside the coverage of what the First Amendment
is all about. That does not mean
that it should be regulated--only
that it would not be unconstitutional to do so. "
Addressing the need to reexamine the relationship between
pornography and social behavior,
Schauer said, "Regardless of the
outcome of the issue fifteen years
ago, it never hurts to ree amine
something in an open-minded,
relatively academic sense . The issue is obviously a pressing one. "
After the conclusion of public
hearings, the panel will present a
written report to the attorney general in June of 1986. The commission is headed by Henry Hudson,
commonwealth's attorney for AIlington County, Virginia, a Washington suburb . ~
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Speaking out:
Karen Ann Quinlan and the "right-to-die"
by Yale Kamisar
A decade after the Supreme
Court of New Jersey granted permission to disconnect her mechanical respirator1 and after years of
defying" the experts who testified
that she could not survive without
the assistance of that apparatus,
Karen Ann Quinlan died last June.
But it is plain that the landmark
case which bears her name will
live for a long, long time.
(I should point out that the New
Jersey Supreme Court's opinion
in the Conroy case (1985) 2 is more
thoughtful and careful and, in my
view, a good deal more honest
than the one handed down nine
years earlier in the Quinlan case.
But the Quinlan case has a life of
its own. It captured the world's
attention, significantly influenced
the law in other jurisdictions, and
may have changed our way of
thinking about involuntary euthanasia for many years to come.
Thus, in this short piece I shall
focus only on that celebrated case.)
When the decision in Quinlan
was handed down a decade ago,
and again when Ms . Quinlan died
last June, front-page stories called
the case a "historic 'right to die'"
decision. And from the outset it
has almost been universally reported and discussed as such. But
look again: was it really a "right-todie" case? I think not.
I believe it more accurate-albeit
much more troublesome -to
view it as what might be called a
"power-to-let-some-other-die"
case. (Keep in mind that Karen was
supposed to die shortly after the
respirator was removed, not many
years later. The case should be
read in that light.)
Many who shrink at the thought
of "actively" causing the death
11
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of another, however pitiful that
other's condition, may be willing
to "rest that person in God's
hands" or "leave that person to her
fate" -that is to say, let that person
die. But-however wide the difference psychologically-letting
people die when you have a special relationship with them and an
affirmative duty to care for them
is the logical equivalent of killing
them.
Up to the time that the Quinlan
case caught the headlines and
the covers of national magazines,
there was general agreement that
the most important safeguard in
the various proposals to legalize
one or more forms of euthanasia
was the requirement that the patient personally request or consent
to such a course of action (or inaction). This safeguard was ob-

s
viously lacking in the Quinlan case.
Karen did not and in her condition, of course, could not consent
to her death or ask anyone else
to let her die. Nor had she made
a "living will" or executed any directive requesting that she be
allowed to die without "medical
intervention."
Karen's mother, Julia, has told
the media that several years before her daughter slipped into a
coma, Karen had told her that she
"would never want her life prolonged unnecessarily by extraordinary medical treatment." It is hard
to believe Karen used the term "extraordinary means." If one reads
the book about the Quinlan case
co-authored by Julia and her husband, one discovers that Karen's
mother had "never heard" of the
concept of "extraordinary means"
until the Quinlan family pastor,
the Rev. Thomas Trapasso, explained the doctrine to her-after
Karen had slipped into a coma.
Finally, both the lower court and
the Supreme Court of New Jersey
agreed-although their conclu-
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sions went largely unreportedthat Karen's alleged previous expressions of her views on this
issue, such as the time when a
friend's father died of cancer, were
so casual, impersonal, abstract and
equivocal as to lack the requisite
probative value.
As I read the opinion of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, it
would have reached the same result if there had been no testimony
whatever about Karen's previous
conversations and remarks .
The key to the opinion, I think,
is the reasoning that if Karen's constitutional right of privacy includes
a right to elect to die and we cannot tell what choice she would
have made as a particular individual, we may surmise that she
would have chosen to die because
we presume that the great majority
of those in her situation would
have so chosen.
Even if we accept the unexamined and undocumented
assumption of the 1976 New
Jersey Supreme Court that a majority of those in Karen's plight
would wish to die, this is not, or at
least should not be, the end of the
matter. Even if only a very few
patients in Karen's set of circumstances were determined to
struggle on, is the fact that they are
in the distinct minority a justification for defying them their personal
right to struggle on? After all, comatose patients are not fungibles .
Society's silent majority cannot, or
at least should not, speak for all of
those in Quinlan-type situations.
Evidently, the 1976 New Jersey Supreme Court thought it could-all
in the name of Karen's "constitutional right of privacy" which is the
right of the individual.
When I discussed this case some
years ago with the late Harold
Leventhal, a highly respected
federal judge, he responded:
"It may well be that an unspoken
element of the Quinlan decision is
the interest of the family of being
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free of an unbearable emotional
burden. Perhaps it is unarticulated
because of our emotional historyas individuals and as a collective
society. This leads us to formulate
decisions in terms of the implication of the patient's will that she
should die . This may be a fiction or
construct, but it is the kind of transition that makes for survival.
"We inherit all kinds of unlogic," continued Leventhal. "But
our human relationships depend
on fragile balances . Sometimes
they must be approached in a soft
light, subdued by history, rather
than in the bright spotlight of
utmost analytic clarity."
There is, of course, something to
be said for Leventhal's viewpoint.
But sometimes, and this may be
one of those times, "soft lights" are
too seductive.
It cannot be denied that Quinlan
presented a very appealing case
for discontinuing life support. The

s
case may arguably be limited to its
extreme facts. But in my judgement the reasoning of the Quinlan
opinion is not so limited.
The Quinlan Court authorized
the withdrawal of Karen's life-support system if and when the doctors concluded that "there is no
reasonable possibility of Karen's
ever emerging from her present
comatose condition to a cognitive,
sapient state." But there are many
thousands of others-for example,
severely mentally deficient and
congenitally deformed children
and adults suffering from senile
dementia-whose tragic conditions may be as unequivocally described as "irreversible" as was
Miss Quinlan's.
It is not a very long step from
the Quinlan case for another court
another day to use the Quinlan
court's language as follows: "We
have no doubt, in these unhappy
circumstances, that if this Down's
syndrome child (or senile old man)
were himself miraculously lucid
for an interval and perceptive of
his irreversible condition, he could
effectively decide upon death . The
only practical way to prevent destruction of this person's 'right to
die' is to allow his guardian and
family to decide whether, if he
could think and speak clearly, he
would wish to exercise this right in
these circumstances ."
The Quinlan case, I fear, badly
smudged, if it did not erase, the
distinction between the right to
choose one's own death and the
right to choose someone else's. ~
1. In re Quinlan , 70 N .J. 10, 355 A .2d 647
(1976) (Hughes, J. ).
2. Matter of Conroy, 98 N .J. 321, 486 A.2d
1209 (1985) (Schreiber, J. ).

Yale Kamisar

The above article is based on a shorter
piece that appeared in The New York
Times, June 17, 1985 . Copyright"
1985 by the New York Times Company.
Yale Kamisar is the Henry K. Ransom
Professor of Law at Michigan.
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Booked up
A vintage year for new volumes b-y Law School faculty
by Susan Isaacs Nisbett
In the 1960s, Law School faculty
took up their pens to map out
newly emerging fields of the law.
The examples are easy to come by:
Terrance Sandalow co-authored
Government in Urban Areas ( with
Frank Michelman); Alfred Conard
changed the way business law was
taught in Enterprise Organization;
Eric Stein developed teaching
materials that defined international law; Theodore St. Antoine
(with Russell Smith and Leroy
Merrifield) developed Labor Relations Law: Cases and Materials; and
Yale Kamisar produced Modern
Criminal Procedure (joined by Jerold
Israel and Wayne LaFave in later
editions).
As they delineated new areas,
Michigan's landmark casebooks
also determined law school curricula. They were intellectual
achievements with extraordinary
classroom ramifications.
In the 1980s Michigan faculty
are not only shaping their fields
with important contributions to
the traditional study of law, they
are also breaking new ground
through diverse interdisciplinary
approaches to legal thought. The
latter works are, for the most part,
reflective volumes, written by lawyer-humanists who are also historians (Thomas Green, Joseph
Vining), philosophers (Philip
Soper), sociologists (Richard Lempert), and literary critics (James
Boyd White). And they are written
for an audience of humanists and
scholars who may or may not be
lawyers. Like their worthy predecessors, these books will have
ramifications inside the classroom.
But they are also likely to attract
the attention of scholars in other
disciplines.
4

In the area of "traditional" legal
writing, Law School faculty are
still developing and chronicling
their fields with important casebooks and treatises. For example,
Criminal Procedure (West Publishing Company), a new three-volume treatise by leading criminal
law authorities Wayne R. LaFave
and Law School Professor Jerold
Israel, is the definitive work on all
stages and aspects of the subject.
Citing over 6,000 cases ("fortunately, LaFave read more of
them than I did," Israel quips), the
new treatise presents comprehensive coverage of pre-arrest investigation, pretrial and trial proceedings, appeal, and post-conviction
remedies.
Professor Edward Cooper's
work on justiciability, which represents a major contribution to this
area of the law, appears in the
emerging second edition of Federal
Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction.
This multi-volume treatise on
federal jurisdiction and related
subjects was written in collaboration with Professor Charles Alan
Wright of the University of Texas
and Professor Arthur R. Miller of
Harvard. The growth of this area
of law has been so explosive that
the justiciability materials, which
comprised some 185 pages in the
first edition (1975), were expanded
to more than 900 pages in the second edition.
From Roger A. Cunningham
comes The Law of Property (West
Publishing Company, 1984), written with William B. Stoebuck and
Dale A. Whitman. The book, available in both student and lawyer
editions, fills the need for a comprehensive, up-to-date, single-volume "hornbook" on property law.

s
Last year also saw the publication
of a fourth edition of the widely
used casebook, Basic Property Law,
which Cunningham edited in conjunction with Law Professors
Emeritus Olin L. Browder and
Allan F. Smith. Cunningham, together with Richard F. Broude, a
practicing attorney, also published
a substantially revised third edition of Penney and Broude's Cases
on Land Financing (Foundation
Press, 1985). A second edition of
Mandelker & Cunningham's Planning and Control of Land Development, one of the most widely used
casebooks in its field, is due from
the Michie Company later this
year.
But other books by Law School
faculty-already on booksellers'
shelves or due there soon--exemplify a reflective rather than a
comprehensive mood, attributable, without doubt, to the breadth
of the current faculty's interests,
and perhaps also to an end-of-century need to probe the past and examine possible futures.
In A Theory of Law (Harvard University Press, 1984), legal philosopher Philip Soper tackles the
central questions of political and
legal theory: "Why should I obey
the law?" "What is law?" A satisfying answer, Soper says, can be
constructed only when the two
questions are considered together.
Soper argues that a legal system-as opposed to one that is
merely coercive-must aim at serving the interests of the community.
What is essential to legal systems,
according to Soper, is the claim by
those in authority that they act in
the interest of all. He shows how
this official claim of justice explains
existing concepts of law as well as
the obligation to obey. Finally, he
examines the implications of this
definition of law for some jurisprudential puzzles: for example, the
distinction between the court as
lawfinder and the legislature as
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lawmaker, and the idea of natural,
preexisting rights.
Like Soper's book, Richard
Lempert's An Invitation to Law and
Social Science: Desert, Disputes and
Distribution , considers law's connection to other major disciplines.
The book, written with colleague
Joseph Sanders, of the University
of Houston Law School, will be
published by Longman's in late
1985 or early 1986. The volume is
designed both to introduce students to the ways in which research in law and social science
can enhance our understanding of
law and the legal system and to offer legal scholars and social scientists a vision of this field as a
unified area of inquiry. The book
focuses on issues of responsibility
or desert, as well as dispute settlement, and the effects and implications of using law to redistribute
welfare . In each area, research in
the field is synthesized and new
theoretical perspectives are
offered .
While Lem pert seeks to reaffirm
the connection between law and
the social sciences, Joseph Vining,
in The Authoritative and the Authoritarian (University of Chicago
Press) places law squarely within
the humanities. The book links the
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professional concerns of lawyers
with individuals' concerns for authenticity and authority in personal life . As its title suggests, The
Authoritative and the Authoritarian
confronts the issue of law's authority, thus following Vining's earlier
Legal Identity as the second "chapter" in his study of the phenomenon of personification in law.
Law's authority, Vining posits,
is not an inherent quality; rather, it
comes from the attitudes that citizens and lawyers bring to its materials-and which those materials
may fail or succeed in sustaining.
Vining also confronts the possibility that law's sister discipline
remains theology-despite lawyers' efforts over the centuries to
distance themselves from it. In the
course of discussion, Vining addresses the use of illusion, self-delusion, and tricks in legal thought
and method .
While Soper and Vming tum
their attention to questions of authority, First Amendment scholar
Lee Bollinger explores Americans'
freedom to speak as they please in
The Tolerant Society: Free and Extremist Speech in America (Oxford University Press). Dissatisfied with
current theories concerning the

s

modem concept of free speech,
Bollinger has sought new explanations for the remarkable legal principle that protects even highly
subversive and socially harmful
speech activity from government
regulation. One of the greatest failings of earlier theories, Bollinger
says, is their inability to account
for this "overprotection" of extremist speech or adequately to explain
the benefit society derives from
such protection.
Unlike previous theorists, who
seek to justify the special protections afforded speech activity under the First Amendment by
focusing on the differences between
speech and other behavior,
Bollinger focuses on the similarities
between the problematic feelings
we experience in both verbal and
nonverbal encounters . Both ''bad
speech" and nonspeech behavior,
Bollinger notes, can lead us to respond excessively or in undesirable ways, even in instances in
which some punitive response
is appropriate . From this perspective, the extraordinary selfrestraint we practice toward
speech under the free-speech
principle can be justified, he
contends, as a symbolic societal
5
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In columns left to right: 1. Joseph Vining; 2. Lee Bollinger, Roger Cunningham , Edward
Cooper; 3. Richard Lempert, James Boyd White; 4. Thomas Green, Jerold Israel; 5. Philip Soper.

statement of a commitment to exercise self-control over impulses
encountered throughout all forms
of social interaction (hence the association of free speech with "tolerance"), and not as a posture
logically mandated by any special
qualities of speech.
Lip-service tolerance is common
in the free-speech area, and many
Americans would doubtless favor
stiffer penalties for those exercising their right to extremist speech
than the ones actually imposed .
But as one discovers in Thomas A.
Green's Verdict According to Conscience: Perspectives on the English
Criminal Trial Jury, 1200-1800 (University of Chicago Press), Englishmen pressed into service as
jurors often considered proposed
sanctions extreme. They used their
discretionary power, particularly
in capital cases, to craft punishments they considered more appropriate to the crime. In other
6

cases, they "nullified" (i.e . acquitted a defendant) because they
found the activity justified in itself.
Analyzing trial records and
legal commentary in the context of
social and political thought, and
raising essential questions about
the moral balance among individual cases, general rules, and
the preservation of society, Green
documents the tensions that arose
between fixed rules of law and
popular notions of appropriate
punishments . Throughout the
book, he focuses on the phenomenon of nullification, the
jury's unofficial-and often
exercised-power to acquit a defendant who in legal theory, and
on the basis of the facts known
to the jurors, should have been
convicted.
In this first unified, interpretive
history of the English trial jury
from its inception to the eve of the
Victorian criminal-code reforms,

s
Green demonstrates that judicial
authorities came to tolerate, and
even to depend on, the leniency
that the use of nullification could
bring to a trial. Over time, authorities reduced the scope of such discretion, but did not eliminate it. Indeed, 17th-century attempts to
exert greater control over jury behavior led political dissidents to
claim for the jury the right to find
law. Green concludes that Victorian reform of felony sanctions
reduced the need for mitigation,
strengthened the concept of a
mere fact-finding jury, and thus
ultimately weakened the plausibility of law-finding claims.
Green thus brings the
historian's perspective to Verdict
According to Conscience. But it is the
literary sensibility that marks the
two newest books of James Boyd
White, who is also a professor
of English and classics at the
University.
In When Words Lose Their Meanings: Constitutions and Reconstitutions of Language, Character, and
Community (University of Chicago
Press, 1984), White develops a way
of reading and analyzing texts. He
then applies it to poems, to essays,
and to historical, philosophical,
political, and legal texts . Casting
his net over a broad sea of disciplines, White demonstrates that
their apparently distinct concerns
for truth, beauty, and justice are in
fact deeply related .
In his forthcoming Heracles'
Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of the I.aw (University of Wisconsin Press), White applies his
method of reading to a set of legal
and nonlegal texts and problems.
In the process, he develops support for his thesis that law-particularly in its practices---can be
understood as an art of language,
community, and ethics . 131

Susan Isaacs Nisbett is the former
editor of Law Quadrangle Notes.
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Conversing with Judge Kearse
Distinguished alumna returns as a DeRoy Fellow
In early February, Federal Judge
Amalya L. Kearse spent three days
at the Law School as a DeRoy Fellow. The DeRoy fellowships were
established in 1980 to give students
contact with leading public officials and private attorneys.
Like John H. Pickering, who
was a DeRoy fellow in 1984, Judge
Kearse is a distinguished graduate
of the Law School, which awarded
her the J. D. degree cum laude in
1962. She attended Michigan after
receiving her B.A. degree from
Wellesley College in 1959. During
her career at the Law School she
was elected to Order of the Coif,
served as a Law Review editor, and
was winner of the freshman class
moot court competition.
Upon graduating from the Law
School, Judge Kearse accepted a
position with the Wall Street firm
of Hughes, Hubbard & Reed,
where she engaged in general corporate litigation before state and
federal trial and appellate courts
and administrative agencies in
matters involving antitrust, banking, real estate, securities,
copyright, contract, commercial,
trusts, administrative, criminal
and constitutional law issues. She
was a partner with the firm from
1969 to 1979, when she ascended
the bench of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.
During her stay at the Law
School, Judge Kearse addressed
students in sections of lawyers and
clients, the administration of criminal justice, criminal procedure,
civil procedure, contracts, and
copyright. She also dined and met
informally with students and
faculty.
She took time from her busy
schedule to sit down for an inter-

Amalya Kearse

view with former Law Quadrangle
Notes editor Susan Isaacs Nisbett.
LQN: What are your impressions of today's U-M Law School
students?
ALK: So far, I've visited Yale Kamisar's criminal procedure class
and also lawyers and clients . I had
the slight feeling that the students
of my era may have been a little bit
more passive than today's
students.
LQN: What types of questions
are students posing to you?
ALK: How to get to be a judge;
how the court operates; what my
law clerks do for me.
LQN: What motivated your decision to go to Wall Street when
you graduated from the Law
School?
ALK: I wanted to be a litigator
and I didn't have any particular
substantive area I preferred to litigate over any other. I thought of
Wall Street as the Big Leagues, and
I wanted to see if I would make it
in the Big Leagues.

s
LQN: How did your judgeship
come about?
ALK: In 1978, Congress created
a large number of new judgeships-35 court of appeals and 117
district court positions-with the
Omnibus Judge Act. Previously,
United States senators recommended people to the president.
President Carter, however, managed to get fairly complete control
of the court of appeals judge appointments. There are a number of
states in each circuit, and therefore
it was logical for the president,
rather than the Senate, to handle this. So screening panels were
set up for each circuit and panels
recommended a number of people .
In the Second Circuit, there
were two vacancies and eight recommendations. The panel was
activated in January, 1979, and
received applications and recommendations and solicited applications . When I saw the notice in the
New York Law Journal , I sent in my
resume-I wasn't taking any
chances that they wouldn't think
of me.
LQN: Was being a judge a longtime career aspiration?
ALK: It wasn't a career path I
thought about a lot. A few years
before, I had been contacted
about a district court judgeship; I
thought I'd rather be on the court
of appeals than on the district
court.
LQN: Why was that?
ALK: There's quite a difference
in the type of operation an appeals
court judge engages in. It's more of
a scholarly actitivty. You get a factual record from the parties in the
district court, and you deal with
that set of facts and try to figure
out what the law is. It's research
intensive and involves a lot of writing. I like to write and I like to do
research, so the appeals court attracted me more.
LQN: What are some of the differences between the life of a litigator and a judge?
7
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ALK: The pace of life is very different. I find I work just as hard as
I used to on my busiest days as a
litigator. Most of my deadlines are
self-imposed-I can give myself an
extension-but you end up with a
backlog that grows if you're too lenient with yourself. The great difference is that we don' t have any
valleys to go with the peaks. The
workload is inexorable .
LQN: What do you think is the
best preparation for the bench?
ALK: I think that a litigation
background is the most helpful. It
helps to know about the litigation
process and the courts. There are a
lot of law professors who are appellate judges now, and that is also
a good preparation. The ability to
get into an area and become as expert as one needs to is very useful.
LQN: You're an expert bridge
player and have written extensively about the game. Do you still
play and do you have any more
books in the works?
ALK: I haven't played much
since I got on the bench, but I'm
about to come out of hibernation.
And I have no more books in the
works since Bridge Conventions
Complete, 2nd edition, which I
completed last year, set me so
far behind on my opinions that
I'm just recovering now. Bridge
is relaxing, but it is a second
profession.
LQN: There were very few
women in your Law School graduating class, weren't there?
ALK: Yes . Eight women started
and four finished. A fifth finished
at the University of Kansas.
LQN: Do you have any frustrations being a government
employee?
ALK: It's difficult to get the government to do things sometimes.
And the bureaucracy is not the
swiftest. But I actually think my
job is the best job in the world . It
wouldn't be for everyone, but it is
for me . ~
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Preparing for the real world
Students flood clinic-type seminars
Two clinic-type seminars, offered for the first time in an intensive
format last semester, were flooded
by a deluge of students eager to
gain practical legal experience.
Both courses-trial practice and
a non-credit negotiations workshop-saw students willingly
forfeit free time to tackle a demanding schedule that left them
exhausted, but with a new
awareness of the legal and interpersonal skills required of successful practicing attorneys . Both
programs were supported by a
grant from the DeRoy Testamentary Foundation, one of several
philanthropies founded by Helen
L. DeRoy (1882-1977) in the greater
Detroit area. The Foundation,

headed by Leonard Weiner, a 1935
Law School graduate, has also
supported other programs at the
Law School. Most notable among
these are the DeRoy Fellowships,
which bring distinguished lawyers
and public officials to the School
for visits of several days to several
weeks .
Trial practice, scheduled for the
week of spring break to accommodate sixty students rather than the
usual thirty-two, drew still another
sixty who had to be turned away
because of limited space. Taught
by local attorney and Law School
graduate Edward Stein for the past
thirteen years, the course had always met one night a week for a
three-hour session .

Judge Judith Wood listens to the testimony of a "witness" during one of the Saturday trials of
last spring's trial practice course.

B

This year the format was
changed to a week-long series of
small group workshops (of twelve
students each) that met from 8:30
a.m. to 5 p.m . Evenings were
spent preparing for the next day's
assignment. On Saturday, fifteen
jury trials were held, with each
student participating as part of a
two-person team, and local attorneys serving as judges. The
change was instituted both to
make the class available to more
students and to simulate the intensity, momentum, and stress of a
real-life trial situation.
A special faculty of experienced
trial practitioners was brought in
by Stein for the week. Leading the
workshops were Federal Judge
Ralph Guy from Detroit and attorneys James Brady and William Jack
from Grand Rapids, Allyn Kantor
from Ann Arbor, and Robert
Krause from Detroit. The daily sessions included lectures, discussions of simulated trial problems,
and role-playing. During each session every student performed a
trial task, such as direct examination, cross examination, opening
statement, and closing argument.
Performances were videotaped
and critiqued by the small section
instructor as well as by the other
studen ts and a communications
expert, Morleen Rouse, of the University of Cincinnati.
Though most students found
the workload heavy and the experience fatiguing, their comments
on the course and the instructors
rang with enthusiasm: "Fantastic
instruction." "Best course I've had
in law school." "Do it again. This
should be a required course . I
could not imagine being a litigator
without first having had the benefit of this excellent learning experience." "I'm excited about being a
lawyer again."
Encouraged by the outcome of
the class, Stein plans to repeat the
format next year with a further expanded enrollment and additional
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outside experts to head the increased number of small groups.
The other popular clinic-type
seminar was a two-day, non-credit
workshop aimed at developing negotiating skills . Held during the
first weekend in March, the course
attracted over sixty students, only
twenty of whom could be accommodated in the small-group format. The workshop was organized
by Professor James J. White, an expert in commercial law and Dr.
Andrew S. Watson, a practicing
psychiatrist who is a professor in
the Law School. First-hand perspectives on negotiating were provided by Detroit attorneys
Leonard D. Givens and PatrickJ.
Ledwidge, who each presented a
lecture and led one of the small
groups. Within each small group,
the students were divided into
two-person negotiating teams,
each of which negotiated against
the other.
Each team was presented with a
set of facts regarding a simulated
negotiating problem, representing
the point of view of one of the parties and differing from that of their
adversaries . The task, then, as
Watson explains, was "to cross the
barrier and negotiate successfuJJy
without falling prey to personal
emotional responses, prejudices or
other character-based behavior
that might inhibit the process. "
To facilitate greater insight and
self-awareness, students were
videotaped as they negotiated.
Their performances were critiqued
by their peers and professors with
regard to such psychological elements as body language, ability to
communicate, and interpersonal
skills, as well as the logical, analytical, technical, and legal mechanics involved in reaching a
satisfactory settlement. "We view
this as the first step in a two-thousand-mile journey," said White of
the workshop, which was viewed
as a giant step toward the real
world by those who took it. ~

s
McCree honored
at three spring
commencements

Wade H. McCree, Jr.

Among Law School faculty,
Wade H. McCree Jr. is one of the

most popular commencement
speakers and prolific recipients of
honorary degrees from colleges
and universities. Last spring, the
former federal judge and U.S. Soliciter General who since 1981 has
been Lewis M. Simes Professor of
Law at the U-M, received three
honorary titles: a Doctor of Humane Letters from Colgate University, a Doctor of Public Service
from Northern Michigan University, and a Doctor of Law from Suffolk University.
Modest about his achievements,
McCree has lost count of his
awards and has to rely on his secretary for an accurate total of his
honorary doctorate degrees,
which now stands at 32 and growing. McCree, who in 1982 was appointed Special Master by the U .S.
Supreme Court for a case involving the Howard Hughes estate,
serves on the visiting committees
of several law schools and is a
member of a long list of professional, educational, and community organizations. ~
9

B

Social workers
honor Duquette as
Citizen of the Year
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prehensive trainir:g program for
law students in child advocacy
specializations. Duquette's research on improving guardian ad
/item (GAL) services is described in
detail in Law Quadrangle Notes , (Vol.
28, No. 3) pp. 1-2.
Besides serving on the Washtenaw County Board of Commissioners, Duquette is a member of
the board of the National Associa-

s
tion of Counsel for Children and
the board of the Washtenaw
County Child Care Coordinating
and Referral Service. He was appointed by Michigan's Governor
Blanchard to the Child Abuse Prevention Board, and served on a
planning committee appointed by
State Chief Justice Coleman to assess placement barriers for foster
care. 181

Guest stars enrich faculty

Donald Duquette

Citing "his unswerving commitment to children's welfare, his
willingness to take risks to advance human conditions, and his
commitment to an effective and
just political process," the Huron
Valley Unit of the National Association of Social Workers named
Donald Duquette Citizen of the
Year.
Duquette, who directs the
Child Advocacy Clinic at the Law
School, is a former social worker
who decided to pursue a law degree as a more effective way of
advancing child rights and protections . He received his J.D. from
Michigan in 1974. As Project Director for the Juvenile Court Children
at Risk Study and for the National
Center on Child Abuse and
Neglect, he designed programs
to improve the representation of
children affected by child abuse
and child neglect cases . His present work as Director of the Child
Advocacy Clinic involves a com10

A number of outstanding visiting faculty have enriched the Law
School's curriculum and intellectual life this year.
Four visiting faculty members
spent the fall and winter semesters
on campus:

addition to her J.D . from Yale Law
School, where she was editor of
the Yale Law Review. From 1974 to
1979, Lachman was a professor of
economics at Vanderbilt University. During the 1977-78 academic
year she was a visiting professor of
economics at the U-M.

0 Wendy J. Gordon taught torts

0 William Ian Miller visited from

and theory of intellectual property. A graduate of Cornell University and of the University of
Pennsylvania Law School, she
spent last year as a visiting professor at Georgetown and the previous year as a visiting associate at
Weil, Gotshal & Manges in New
York City. Gordon's academic
studies include a year as a special
student at Yale Law School, after
which she served as clerk to the
Honorable T. R. Newman, Jr.,
D.C. Superior Court.

D Judith A. Lachman visited from
the University of Wisconsin Law
School, teaching torts, taxation,
and a seminar in constitutional
law. Lachman pursued undergraduate studies at the University
of California-Santa Barbara and at
the University of Redlands . She
holds an M.A. degree in mathematics and a Ph .D. in economics
from Michigan State University in

the University of Houston . His
course offerings included property, trusts and estates, and a seminar entitled "Blood Feud : Dark
Age Dispute ." Miller is a graduate
of the University of WisconsinMadison and of Yale University,
where he received both his Ph .D.
in English and his J. D. He has
taught English at Weslyan University and, prior to joining the University of Houston law faculty, was
an attorney with the Madison,
Wisc., firm of Cullen & Weston.
D Patricia D. White visited from
the Georgetown University Law
Center, teaching several courses in
taxation . White is thrice a Michigan alumna, having received her
B.A., M.A. (philosopy), andJ.D .
('74) in Ann Arbor. Prior to joining
the Georgetown faculty in 1979,
she practiced with the Washington, D.C., firms of Steptoe &
Johnson and Caplin & Drysdale .

B

In 1976, she was a visiting professor of law at the University of
Toledo.

Six faculty members visited for the
fall term only.
D Roger C. Cramton, the Robert
S. Stevens Professor of Law at
Cornell University Law School,
taught two sections of torts. Former dean of the Cornell Law
School, Cramton served on the
U-M Law School faculty from 1961
to 1973, during which time he
was also chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United
States and assistant attorney general in the U.S. Department of Justice. A graduate of Harvard,
Cramton received his J. D. from the
University of Chicago, where he
also studied theology. Upon graduation, he clerked for the Honorable S. R. Waterman, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit,
and then for the Honorable Harold
Burton of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Cramton was the first chairman of
the board of directors of the Legal
Services Corporation and is editor
of the Journal of Legal Education.
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of Holy Cross College, Gifford received an LL.B. from Harvard University and a J.S.D. from Columbia
University. Before beginning his
teaching career at Vanderbilt University, Gifford practiced law in
New York with Cleary, Gottlieb,
Steen & Hamilton. His teaching
assignments have included SUNYBuffalo, England's Warwick University, France's Universite Jean
Moulin, and Belgium's Universite
Libre de Bruxelle.

D Roger C. Park also visited from
the University of Minnesota. A
pioneer in developing computeraided instruction materials for law,
Park taught courses in civil procedure and evidence. Park received both his undergraduate and
law degrees from Harvard University, where he was editor of the
Harvard Law Review. After clerking
for the Honorable Bailey Aldrich,
Chief Judge for the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit in
Boston, Mass., he practiced with
the Boston firm of Zalkind, Silverglate. He has taught political
science at Wellesley and has been a
visiting professor at Stanford Law
School and Boston University Law
School.

D Rudolf Dolzer, a specialist in
international law, visited from the
Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law. Dolzer holds a B.A.
from Gonzaga University, a doctorate from the University of
Heidelberg Law School, and an
LL.M. and S.J.D. from Harvard
Law School. He has taught at the
University of Heidelberg and also
at the University of Tubingen.

D Steven Shiffrin, professor of
law at UCLA, taught courses in
two of his specialties, First
Amendment law and constitutional law and political theory.
Shiffrin holds both the B.A. and
J.D. degrees from Loyola University. After graduating from law
school, he clerked for U.S. District
Court Judge Warren Ferguson in
Los Angeles and then joined the
firm of Irell and Manella, where he
is still of counsel. Shiffrin has also
taught law at Boston University.

D Daniel J. Gifford, professor of
law at the University of Minnesota,
offered courses in antitrust and
unfair trade practices. A graduate

D Aaron D. Twerski taught
courses in torts and products liability. Twerski is acting dean and

s
the Sieben & Sieben Distinguished
Professor of Law at Hofstra University. He received his undergraduate degree from the
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and his J. D. from
Marquette University. After a year
as a trial attorney in the U.S. Department of Justice, he served as a
teaching fellow at Harvard Law
School before taking up an academic appointment at Duquesne
Law School. He has served as a
visiting professor at Cornell and at
Boston University.

During the winter semester, five
visiting faculty taught at the Law
School.

D Yehuda Blum, Israel's ambassador and permanent representative to the United Nations from
1978 to 1984, visited from Hebrew
University in Jerusalem, where he
holds the Hersch Lauterpacht
Chair in International Law. He
taught courses in international law
and international organizations.
Blum has served as assistant to
the Judge Advocate General in Israel's Defense Forces and as assistant legal advisor in Israel's
Foreign Ministry. He was a member of the Israeli negotiating team
at the Camp David and Blair
House talks in February and
March 1979. He holds an M. Jur.
from Hebrew University School
of Law and a Ph.D. in international law from the University of
London. The author of several
books and numerous articles in
English, Hebrew, and German, he
has also served as the Encyclopedia
Hebraica's law editor since 1973. He
has been a visiting professor at the
University of Texas and NYU law
schools, and in 1969 spent nine
months at the Law School as a senior research scholar.
l1
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0 Trevor C. Hartley, senior lecturer in law at the London School
of Economics, taught Common
Market law and international business. Hartley received his B.A .
and LL. B. degrees from the University of Cape Town and his
LL.M. from London University.
His major academic interests are
European Community law and
conflict of laws/private international law; he is the author of four
books in these areas . Prior to
teaching at the London School of
Economics, Hartley served on the
faculty of the University of Western Ontario in London, Ontario.

D John E. Nowak visited from the
University of Illinois, teaching
courses on constitutional law and
the Fourteenth Amendment. A
graduate of Marquette University
and the University of Illinois College of Law, Nowak served as clerk
to the Honorable W. V. Schaefer of
the Supreme Court of Illinois before beginning his teaching career
at Illinois. He has written extensively about criminal and constitutional law.

D Mathias W. Reimann visited
from the University of Freiburg
Law School, of which he is a graduate . After receiving the LL.M.
from Michigan in 1983, Professor
Reimann spent last fall here as
a research scholar. He was a research assistant at the Law School
during 1983. During the winter
term he offered a course in European civil codes .
O Stephen Schulman, professor
of law at Wayne State University
Law School, taught a course in corporations. Schulman holds a J.D.
from Columbia Law School and an
LL.M. from New York University
Law School. Schulman practiced
law in New York City for several
12
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years before joining the legal staff
of the New York State Attorney
General's Office, where he remained as an attorney for six
years. He joined the Wayne State
faculty in 1966.
During the summer term, three
visiting faculty members taught on
campus.
0 Stephen Calkins, an associate
professor at Wayne State Law
School since 1983, taught torts .
Calkins did his undergraduate
work at Yale University, graduating in 1972 with majors in political
science and economics . He received his J.D. from Harvard Law
School in 1975. Prior to joining the
Wayne State faculty, he practiced
with the Washington D.C. firm of
Covington and Burling for seven
years, when he also was one of
several lawyers teaching an antitrust practice seminar at the University of Virginia Law School.

0 David M. Phillips, visiting
from Boston University, taught
commercial transactions . A graduate of Brandeis University, Phillips
received his J. D. from Columbia in
1967. From 1968 to 1970, Phillips
served as consultant to Dr. Carl
Bartz, Jr., cultural attache to Korea .
During the latter two years of this
period, he lectured at the Graduate
School of Law, Seoul National University. He has also taught in the
Harvard University extension program, and served as a visiting professor at the University of Virginia
School of Law.

D Christopher D. Stone, who is
Roy P. Crocker Professor of Law at
the University of Southern California, taught enterprise organization
at Michigan this summer. A graduate of Harvard University and Yale

s
Law School, Stone was Fellow in
Law and Economics at the University of Chicago in 1962 before practicing at Cravath, Swaine & Moore
in New York. He has written prolifically on legal rights for natural
resources and on corporate misconduct. Stone has done research
in various areas under the auspices
of the National Institute of Mental
Health, the National Science Foundation, and the Department of
Energy.

0 Still another visiting faculty
member, P. E. Bennett, began a
one-year appointment this summer, teaching criminal appellate
practice. Bennett has been an assistant defender with the Michigan
State Appellate Defender Office in
Lansing since 1977. A 1976 Michigan Law School graduate, he also
holds an M .A . in computer and
communications sciences and a
B.S . in mathematics from the U-M.
Bennett brings to his alma mater
extensive experience with indigent
defendants convicted of felonies.~

New chairs
find occupants
The appointment of Professors
Joseph Vining and James Boyd
White to two recently established
chairs at the Law School was announced by Dean Terrance Sandalow just as the present issue of
Law Quadrangle Notes was going to
press. Vining was named Harry
Burns Hutchins Professor of Law,
while White was appointed L.
Hart Wright Professor of Law. Profiles of these two distinguished
members of our faculty will be featured in the next issue of this
publication. ~

